

BEATTY'S STRATEGY UPHELD IN ENGLAND

Naval Men Say He Was Justified in Risking Ships to Give Jellicoe a Chance at Germans.

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LONDON, Monday, June 5.—Among English naval men THE NEW YORK TIMES correspondent finds very general commendation of the part Admiral Beatty played in the Jutland, or as the Germans call it, the Skagerrak battle. It is admitted that in the superficial aspects the German strategy seemed superior in the sense that the High Seas Fleet was able to get a blow in and escape the full punishment from a superior adversary.

As against this it is argued that Germany cannot afford to lose as much as Great Britain and that consequently Beatty was well justified in exposing himself in order to give Jellicoe's heavy ships an opportunity of delivering a knockout.

Beatty's big ships apparently came up in three detachments in the order of their speed, the newest battle cruisers, mostly with 13.5-inch guns leading, the older ones with 12-inch guns arriving some time later and four fast battle-ships of the Queen Elizabeth class with 15-inch guns latest of all.

In the Dogger Bank battle, where the Blucher was sunk, it was seen that the ultra fast ships which lead the pursuing line are liable to attract heavy punishment from the concentrated fire of ships retreating in company, and at the earliest stage the British handful of biggest battle cruisers may have had nearly all the guns of the German high seas fleet turned on them. It would not be surprising if the Queen Mary was sunk early under those circumstances.

The advent of the three older battle-cruisers under Admiral Hood's flag would not greatly relieve the situation, but the shorter range of their 12-inch guns would make the fight more unequal for them, hence the sinking of their flagship, the Invincible.

After the four Queen Elizabeth type ships came up with their heavier armor and 15-inch guns the battle was less unequal, but the British were still inferior in everything except speed, and as the object was to hold the enemy and not to run away from him the higher speed was not fully utilizable.

How long this action lasted before Admiral Jellicoe's main fleet of battle-ships arrived is not known, but if, as seems likely, his starting point and Admiral Beatty's were about equi-distant from the scene of the battle and both started about midnight he could have hardly joined in much before 8:30 P. M. The light would then be fast falling and the night was moonless.

The Germans turned tail and made off with the British in pursuit. What had previously been a gunfire action between manoeuvring fleets of big ships developed into a running fight, in which most of the losses were inflicted by mines and torpedoes discharged by destroyers and submarines, as under the cover of darkness they ran in among the larger vessels.

The Germans lost ships at this stage, but they had apparently calculated their distance with nicety and were able to reach protected waters by about 4 A. M., just as the increasing daylight gave the British an opportunity to renew the contest of gunfire.

This interposition of the night which balked Jellicoe cannot be put down as an accident. Vice Admiral Scheer had evidently thought it out most carefully, and it seems the key to his whole plan.

Some English critics assert that herein is to be seen superior strategy on the part of the Germans. Their argument is mainly based on the theory that the Admiralty had been influenced by pleas of the east coast populations and had, as they say was indicated in Mr. Balfour's letter to the Mayor of Yarmouth, divided its striking forces into two main fleets. Whether or not this statement is correct only the Admiralty knows, but assuming that it is correct the general result of the battle, according to Great Britain's rather belated reports of the results achieved, i. e., almost equal losses on both sides, would seem to indicate that there were many points in favor of such a strategical plan.